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This article aims to draw on the ‘Qur’anic Rationalism’ of Taqī al-Dīn Ibn 
Taymiyya (1263–1328 CE) in elucidating an Islamic epistemology of theistic 
natural signs, in the lens of contemporary philosophy of religion. In 
articulating what Ibn Taymiyya coins ‘God’s method of proof through signs 
(istidlāluhu taʿālā bi’l-āyāt)’, it seeks aid in particular from the work of C. 
Stephen Evans and other contemporary philosophers of religion, in an 
attempt to understand the relevance and force of this alternative to natural 
theology within the Islamic tradition. In doing so, it aims to respond to 
existing criticisms of Ibn Taymiyya’s perspective in the literature, and to 
consider the implications of a Taymiyyan reading of theistic natural signs, on 
the epistemic function of Qur’anic āyāt as theistic evidence. 
 
Introduction 
The Qur’anic text presents itself as a revelation from God to humanity, comprising a 
tapestry of various divine disclosures or simply, verses, referred to as āyāt. The term āya (pl. 
āyāt) refers to ‘a sign, token, or mark, by which a person or thing is known’ (Lane & Poole 
(1955), 135). In the Qur’anic context, the term āya or āyāt takes on two meanings: (a) as the 
signs of God manifest in the divine speech and revelation itself, and (b) as the signs of God 
evident in the natural world (cf. Ibn Taymiyya (1979), 7:302). Both categories of signs are 
thought to be truly indicative of that to which they point: the reality and unity of the divine. 
But it is to the latter set of signs that we turn our attention towards in this article.  
In her Logic, Rhetoric and Legal Reasoning in the Qur’an: God’s Arguments, Rosalind Ward 
Gwynne writes that ‘a sign [i.e. āya] itself is not an argument but a piece of evidence that 
supports various forms of argument, explicit or implicit’, and that ‘Muslims built an immense 
structure of theological and philosophical argument on the basis of such Qur’anic evidence’, 
citing well-known Muslim philosopher Ibn Rushd (d. 1198 CE) as a prime example (Gwynne 
(2004), 26). In his well-known philo-theological treatise devised for popular consumption, al-
Kashf ‘an Manāhij al-Adilla fī ‘Aqā’id al-Milla, Ibn Rushd outlines two arguments for God’s 
existence which he takes to be grounded in the āyāt of the Qur’an which refer to natural 
phenomena as indications of the Divine, and which he takes to be the primary means by which 
the common believer attains knowledge of God. These two arguments are referred to as dalīl 
al-’ināya or the argument from design/providence and dalīl al-ikhtirā’ or the argument from 
creation/invention (cf. Ibn Rushd (1998)). Ibn Rushd cites a number of Qur’anic verses in 
support of both arguments,1 and thus gives the impression that a proper Qur’anic 
epistemology of treating signs as theistic evidence should construe them as the basis from 
which one formulates arguments typical of natural theology. 
In contrast to Ibn Rushd, who drew upon the signs inherent in Qur’anic verses to 
formulate arguments for God, the fourteenth century Damascene Islamic theologian Ibn 
Taymiyya (d. 1328 CE) offers an alternative approach to seeing how āyāt – by which I mean 
both Qur’anic verses and signs in the natural world – may function as theistic evidence. The 
remainder of this article attempts to explore this alternative, particularly focusing on how Ibn 
Taymiyya views the broader signs in the natural world as theistic evidence, although, as we 
shall see, this will have important implications for how we might view the Qur’anic āyāt as 
engaged in its own distinctive sign-based discourse. In doing so, the article attempts to situate 
Ibn Taymiyya’s ‘inference through signs (istidlāl bi’l-āyāt)’ within the framework of his 
distinctive fiṭra-based epistemology, and draws upon insights from contemporary analytic 
philosophers of religion in articulating the force of this approach. We ought to begin, however, 
by laying down the epistemological grounds on which Ibn Taymiyya’s inference through signs 
is grounded. 
The Taymiyyan epistemological background 
Ibn Taymiyya’s epistemology has sometimes been described as empiricist (cf. Heer 
(1988)). Indeed, for Ibn Taymiyya, of the three primary sources of knowledge, which are 
sense perception (ḥiss), reason (‘aql), and report (khabr; i.e. testimony), sense perception is 
most fundamental, by grasping the particulars which reason requires to do its work of 
abstraction and inference, and is said to be superior to testimony, in its grasping of these 
particulars directly (1979, 7:324).2 However, the centrepiece of Ibn Taymiyya’s epistemology 
is the concept of fiṭra. 
According to Ibn Taymiyya, ‘fiṭra is the original nature of man, uncorrupted by later 
beliefs and practices, ready to accept the true notions of Islam’ (Ibn Taymiyya (1995), 4:245–
246). Carl Sharif El-Tobgui, suggests that in Taymiyyan terms, fiṭra is ‘perhaps best rendered 
as by the term ‘original normative disposition’ (El-Tobgui (2020), 260). This normativity of 
fiṭra perhaps refers to the idea that human nature, qua human nature, ought to, and indeed 
will, accept certain beliefs provided that, as Mehmet Sait Özervarlı remarks, the ‘original and 
distinctive qualities’ of one’s fiṭra are ‘left unaffected by his or her family or social 
environment’ (Özervarlı (2013), 47). Fiṭra, then, is not a faculty for knowing in its own right, 
but instead, the operative focal point to which all other faculties turn for direction; a 
disposition which, in turn, steers our faculties towards truth. Ibn Taymiyya insists that God  
made the fiṭra of His servants disposed to the apprehension and understanding of the 
realities [of things] and to know them. And if it were not for this readiness (i.e. fiṭra) 
within the hearts/minds (qalb) to know the truth, neither speculative reasoning 
would be possible, nor demonstration, discourse or language. (Ibn Taymiyya (1979), 
5:62).3  
For Ibn Taymiyya, it is in virtue of fiṭra that a human’s ‘knowledge of truth … and the 
recognition of falsehood’ is grounded (Ibn Taymiyya (2014), 49), and that ‘children are born 
with sound fiṭra, which if left sound and intact, will make them choose knowledge (ma’rifa) 
over its denial’ (Ibn Taymiyya (1979), 8:385). Therefore, as El-Tobgui remarks, in Ibn 
Taymiyya’s view, ‘the proper functioning of all our epistemic faculties … is  predicated in all 
cases on the health and proper functioning of the fiṭra’ (as El-Tobgui (2020), 271). Of crucial 
significance here is the externalist epistemology that it implies: a faculty-based approach to 
knowledge acquisition. Elsewhere I have suggested that this Taymiyyan epistemology may be 
in some sense comparable or at least compatible with Plantingian proper functionalism (cf. 
Turner (2019)). Perhaps a more precise way of construing it though, is that it is broadly 
compatible with a form of virtue epistemology; one which emphasises the knower’s subjective 
capacities to understand and grasp the truth, more so than mere ‘evidence’ internal to the 
subject.4 So, we may tentatively conclude that knowledge – or perhaps to put it in 
contemporary terms – warrant, in the Taymiyyan scheme, is achieved just so long as one’s 
cognitive faculties, predicated on fiṭra, are functioning properly. 
This epistemological background is crucial when considering the way in which 
knowledge of God can be attained. For one thing, it means that Ibn Taymiyya allows that 
certain beliefs be sufficient for knowledge independent of inference. This is roughly what he 
refers to as ‘ilm ḍarūrī (necessary knowledge; cf. Ibn Taymiyya (1979), 3:309). Importantly, 
such beliefs are inclusive of theistic ones according to Ibn Taymiyya, for he states that, ‘the 
affirmation of the Creator and His perfection is innate (fiṭrīyya) and necessary (ḍarūrīyya) 
with respect to one whose fiṭra remains intact’ (Ibn Taymiyya (1995), 6:73). In other words, 
the existence of God may be known, without recourse to argumentation. If so, then what role 
do theistic signs play, in one arriving at theistic knowledge according to Ibn Taymiyya? 
The Taymiyyan alternative: inference through signs 
In treating Ibn Taymiyya’s inference through signs as in some sense an alternative, I mean 
to point out that, not only does it differ from the sort of approach we have alluded to in the 
work of Muslim philosopher Ibn Rushd, it also contrasts greatly with the general approach 
towards proving or pointing to the existence of God in the Islamic tradition. Typically, Muslim 
theologians (mutakallimūn) have insisted that because knowledge of God is not necessary 
(ḍarūrī), and is instead acquired (muktasab), it must be grounded in inference (cf. Frank 
(1989); Abrahamov (1993); Heer (1993); Uslu (2007)). Therefore, they have usually devised 
sophisticated proofs for God’s existence (cf. Shihadeh (2008).  
For Ibn Taymiyya, such long-winded philosophical methods are not necessary.5 As Anke 
von Kügelgen puts it, in contrast to traditional inferences employed to prove God’s existence, 
Ibn Taymiyya draws on an alternative which he coins, ‘God’s method of proof through signs’ 
(istidlāluhu taʿālā bil-āyāt), the consequence of which he considers to be ‘an immediate – that 
is a fiṭrī knowledge – insofar as the signs indicate the existence of one Creator’ (von Kügelgen 
(2013), 323). The concept of a sign (āyā) as ‘proof’ for God’s existence on Ibn Taymiyya’s view, 
then, is intrinsically linked to fiṭra. Indeed, this is what Ibn Taymiyya explains when he writes 
that ‘proving the existence of God by way of signs (āyāt) is obligatory. This is the way of the 
Qur’an, and inherent in the fiṭra of His servants’, adding that, ‘the sign (āya) indicates the 
object itself of which it is the sign. Every created being is a sign and a proof of the Creator 
Himself’ (Ibn Taymiyya (1995), 1:48). 
For Ibn Taymiyya, this method is radically different from the methods of the falāsifa 
(philosophers) because according to him, ‘the difference between a sign (āya) and a syllogism 
(qiyās) is that the sign entails the entity of which it is the sign’ (Ibn Taymiyya (2005), 194), 
whereas the (categorical) syllogism championed by the falāsifa only proves a universal 
concept in the mind, which shares something in common between a multiplicity of existents. 
For Ibn Taymiyya, istidlāl bi’l-āyāt is the prophetic way: ‘it was the method of the prophets – 
may God bless them – in proving the existence of God to [make] mention of His signs (āyāt) … 
[and] God’s method of proof through signs are plentiful in the Quran’ (ibid., 193–194). Ibn 
Taymiyya also stresses the point that, through means of natural signs, God’s existence is 
proven, that is, His particular nature rather than an abstract concept of a Necessary Being, say, 
stripped of distinct knowable qualities: His signs point to Him individually and prove His 
essential nature as the One Being upon whom all else depends: 
His signs entail Him individually and whose conceptualization precludes plurality in 
Him. Everything else other than He is evidence of His Self and signs of His existence 
… no contingent existent can be actualized without His very self being actual. All 
contingent existents are entailed by Him; they are evidence and a sign of Him. (ibid., 
197) 
But this ‘inference’ through signs is not to be conceived as an inference of any traditional 
kind. It does not appear to work on the basis of clear steps or premises. Indeed, this is what 
Ibn Taymiyya seems to suggest where he writes that, 
affirming one’s knowledge of the Creator and prophecy does not depend on any 
syllogistics (al-aqyisa). Rather, this knowledge is attained from the signs (āyāt) that 
prove a specific matter that is not shared by others. These matters are known by 
means of necessary knowledge (bi’l-’ilm al-ḍarūrī) which does not require discursive 
reasoning (naẓar). (ibid., 401) 
Perhaps, then, we might conceive of Ibn Taymiyya’s inference through signs along the 
lines of what John Henry Newman (d. 1890) coined a ‘natural inference’. According to 
Newman, this  
natural mode of reasoning is, not from propositions to propositions, but from things to 
things … [and the] antecedents commonly are not recognized by us as subjects for 
analysis; nay, often are only indirectly recognized as antecedents at all. Not only is 
the inference with its process ignored, but the antecedent also. (Newman (1909), 
330–331) 
For Newman, this inference is predicated upon a particular ‘instinct’ or ‘instinctive 
perception’ (ibid., 260). In Taymiyyan terms then, this might be to suggest that Ibn Taymiyya’s 
istidlāl bi’l-āyāt could be seen as a sort of ‘natural’ inference or istidlāl, in which an 
apprehension of the antecedent – in this case the signs of God in the natural world – results in 
an immediate grasping of the consequent (i.e. theistic belief). For Ibn Taymiyya, istidlāl bi’l-
āyāt clearly works from things to things, as is evident in his saying that ‘the very knowledge 
of the indicant entails the knowledge of the very thing indicated, just as the sun is the sign of 
daylight’ (Ibn Taymiyya (2005), 194). Moreover, this knowledge is only actualised, on the 
grounds that one’s ‘instinct’ or rather disposition (fiṭra), is intact and prepared for this 
recognition. 
Knowledge of God by way of his signs 
As we have seen then, for Ibn Taymiyya, the pristine way to reach knowledge of God is in 
reference to the many signs which indicate His existence and particular nature. Whether those 
signs be what he refers to as ‘āyāt al-anfus’ (signs within one selves) or ‘āyāt al-āfāq’, signs 
within the horizon and cosmos (Ibn Taymiyya (1979), 3:108). Evidently, according to Ibn 
Taymiyya, such knowledge is fiṭrī: a natural product of sound cognition. Thus, this knowledge 
is thought to be rooted in the sound cognition of one’s qalb (heart/mind): the head of all 
cognition (cf. Ibn Taymiyya (1995), 9:308) and the locus of fiṭra, which guides all faculties to 
their true north. Hence, through the apprehension of God’s signs, ‘when the fiṭra is left 
unspoiled, the heart/mind knows God, loves Him and worships Him alone’ (Ibn Taymiyya 
(2018), 26). 
Significantly, according to Ibn Taymiyya, ‘the signs of God are always known through 
sense perception’ (1995, 2:48), which as Wael Hallaq (1991, 63) notes, includes both its 
‘internal’ and ‘external’ dimensions (al-bāṭin wa’l-ẓāhir).6 Above we spoke of interpreting Ibn 
Taymiyya’s inference through signs in terms of a ‘natural inference’, and this may well be an 
accurate way of construing it, yet, the emphasis on sense perception here also allows us to 
view things in additional light. In his ‘Perceiving Design’, Del Ratzsch – drawing on the ideas 
of Thomas Reid (d. 1796) – argues that belief in a designer from the apparent design in nature, 
can be formed non-inferentially, akin to the way in which we form our ordinary perceptual 
beliefs. Crucially, he suggests that some disposition to form these beliefs is integral to this 
outlook, or as he puts it, ‘built into our cognitive nature’ (Ratzsch (2003), 129). Concerning 
Reid’s view, he concludes that, ‘Reid must be read as holding the view that … recognition of a 
mark as a mark of design is perceptual.’ (ibid., 130). In following Ratzsch, we might think that 
Ibn Taymiyya holds a similar position concerning the connection between our disposition 
(fiṭra) to form theistic beliefs – upon an apprehension of the signs in nature – and our sense 
perceptual faculties. That is, given our fiṭrī disposition to form beliefs about God, our sense 
perceptual faculties may be geared up to form non-inferential beliefs about God from 
perceiving His signs in nature. This knowledge, in the Taymiyyan view, arises through the 
proper function of fiṭra (in conjunction with the relevant cognitive faculties), upon an 
apprehension of these signs, whereby one grasps the necessary concomitance between sign 
and signified, as ‘the created beings that indicate the Creator (al-dalāla ‘alā al-khāliq) … [are] 
concomitant with its Creator, [so] it’s not possible that they exist without the existence of their 
Creator, just as He cannot exist without His knowledge, power, will, wisdom, and mercy ’ (Ibn 
Taymiyya (2005), 245). 
However, although we have suggested that an apprehension of these signs occurs 
through sense perception, it may also include signs tied more intimately to ‘reason’, through 
a pondering or rational reflection. Perhaps then theistic belief may be elicited upon a 
ponderance of the natural world, through an apprehension of the sheer contingency of all that 
exists other than God, for ‘it is known that, apart from God, all contingent existents entail the 
essence of the Lord, may He Be exalted; they cannot exist without the existence of the essence 
of the Lord’ (ibid., 195). Indeed, for Ibn Taymiyya pointing to God’s signs to prove His 
existence constitutes ‘the rational fiṭrī methods (al-ṭuruq al-’aqliyya al-fiṭriyya) which the 
Quran adopts’ (Ibn Taymiyya (1995), 1:49) and hence ‘the rational methods that people 
endowed with reason know by their fiṭra’ (Ibn Taymiyya (1980), 76). Therefore, although it 
may always be the case that in some manner sense perception (external and/or internal) is 
involved in the apprehension of signs, that need not exclude reason (‘aql), which may be at 
the heart of reflection upon God’s signs as well. 
This also need not mean that the process includes discursive reasoning (naẓar) just 
because reason is involved in the reflecting. Rather, it may be as we have suggested above a 
form of ‘natural inference’, or perhaps something closer to what Robert Audi has described in 
an altogether different context as, a ‘conclusion of reflection’ (Audi (2009), 45). As Michael 
Bergmann explains, such reflections need not be based on ‘inferences from premises but 
instead emerge non-inferentially from an awareness of a variety of observations, experiences, 
and considerations over a (perhaps long) period of time’ (Bergmann (2017), 37). These 
conclusions of reflection may include a variety of experiences, memories, and considerations, 
but may also perhaps include what Ibn Taymiyya refers to as simply ‘preliminary intellectual 
reflection (bidāya al-’uqūl)’ (Ibn Taymiyya (2005), 297), that is, what results from the most 
basic and initial impressions of reason (‘aql) itself. Hence, one may entertain in one’s mind the 
collection of āyāt in one’s self and the world ‘out-there’, sensing the utter contingency of all 
physical existents including the universe, and thus, upon such reflections over these different 
signs, when fiṭra is sound, the qalb as the seat of all cognition, comes to know that God exists 
in properly basic fashion. Finally, we may speculate that, the proper basicality of theistic belief 
attained from this process may be conceived along the lines of some version of a faculty-based 
virtue epistemology. 
We may thus summarize the istidlāl bi’l-āyāt as follows (Figure 1): 
 
 
Istidlāl bi’l-āyāt (inference through signs): [1] signs (āyāt) are apprehended through 
sense perception (SP) (and reason (‘aql) in at least some if not all circumstances). [2] 
Fiṭra – when sound – enables what has been received through the subjects’ cognitive 
faculties to be processed properly. [3] The cognitive process functions properly, and 
so one will immediately come to hold a corresponding theistic belief sparked by the 
apprehension of God’s signs, settled in one’s mind/heart (ḥaṣala fī qalbihi), and in 
turn, one will hold a properly basic (PB) theistic belief. 
Wael Hallaq and the problem of circularity 
However, it has been suggested that this notion of an inference through signs which Ibn 
Taymiyya proposes, as outlined above, is somewhat problematic: both contradictory within 
his own thought and epistemically circular. It is to this critique we now turn. Wael Hallaq 
(1991) devotes a significant amount of attention to Ibn Taymiyya’s inference through signs, 
but suggests that there is a difficulty with Ibn Taymiyya’s assertions regarding fiṭra and 
knowledge of God, namely that the idea appears somewhat circular. First, he argues that it is 
circular because Ibn Taymiyya apparently asserts that we come to knowledge of God by way 
of fiṭra, and yet it is God who implanted fiṭra within us: hence we need to assume God’s 
existence in some premise before concluding that He exists. Second, Hallaq argues that Ibn 
Taymiyya impinges on the validity of his argument, by adding the theological assertion that 
fiṭra knows the existence of God even before apprehending theistic natural signs, and that in 
order to know that the signs signify God’s existence, one must know God before being able to 
recognise that these are His signs. This, Hallaq suggests, appears to be circular and given what 
Ibn Taymiyya seems to have said in other places, also somewhat contradictory. So, he states 
that, 
it turns out that while fiṭra apprehends God through the immediacy and necessity 
(ḍarūra) of the sense perception of Signs, such apprehension is said to be implanted 
in fiṭra by God Himself without the medium of Signs. This last assertion clearly injects 
in Ibn Taymiyya’s argument a strong element of circularity. (Hallaq (1991), 65–66) 
How might one respond to Hallaq’s contentions? Let us begin with the first of two charges 
that Ibn Taymiyya’s approach seems epistemically circular, which has it that he suggests that 
we know God via fiṭra, but that it is God who created us upon it, hence somehow assuming His 
existence in a premise antecedent to the conclusion. Now, this would of course be problematic 
if (1), it was supposed to be an argument aimed at demonstrating God’s existence, and (2), if 
one was in what Bergmann coins a ‘question doubting’ context (Bergmann (2006), 199),7 in 
this case concerning the truth of the conclusion that God exists. For if Ibn Taymiyya was 
attempting to demonstrate God’s existence, he may be implicitly putting himself into a 
‘question doubting’ context, where one cannot rely on the truth of that which is in question. 
But that is not what seems to be going on when Ibn Taymiyya says for instance that, the 
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‘recognition of the Creator is innate [and] necessary (fiṭrī ḍarūrī)’ (Ibn Taymiyya (1995), 
16:328). Ibn Taymiyya is merely starting from the supposition that God exists as a piece of 
knowledge that he already holds, and then from that knowledge explaining how it arises or 
has come to be known. Therefore, Ibn Taymiyya is not liable to the charge of epistemic 
circularity in any ‘malignant’ sense. 
But what about the problem that Ibn Taymiyya appears to be contradictory by asserting, 
on the one hand, that we know God by fiṭra through the medium of signs, but then on the other 
hand, that we in fact know Him prior to the signs in order to recognize that they are His? It 
ought to be made clear that it is not as Hallaq suggests, that on occasion Ibn Taymiyya presents 
fiṭra as a faculty for knowing that created things must have a creator, and on other occasions, 
that fiṭra refers to inborn knowledge of the creator. As Ovamir Anjum explains, ‘this second 
view … is explicitly rejected by Ibn Taymiyya’ (Anjum (2012), 221). Anjum notes – in referring 
to Ibn Taymiyya’s main disciple, Ibn al-Qayyim (d. 1350 CE) – how Ibn Taymiyya’s use of 
ma’rifa in the relevant passages as opposed to ‘ilm, demonstrates that such knowledge can 
only refer to knowledge which is acquired (muktasab), that is non-basic, and given other 
explicit passages from Ibn Taymiyya himself, it is clear that the knowledge within fiṭra does 
not refer to knowledge implanted within human beings since birth (ibid., 222). 
However, this still does not explain what Ibn Taymiyya means when he suggests that fiṭra 
knows God prior to perceiving His signs. Indeed, Ibn Taymiyya does state that ‘fiṭra knows the 
Creator without these signs; that knowledge is inherent in it. Had it not known Him before 
these signs, it could not have known that they are His signs’ (Ibn Taymiyya (1995), 1:47). So 
how ought we to understand this passage? First, note that, as we have seen, knowledge of God 
inherent in fiṭra is not something implanted. Second, Hoover – commenting on some of 
Hallaq’s contentions – explains that, according to Ibn Taymiyya, 
it is possible that inner voices (khawāṭir) in the soul alert it to the true religion 
without external teaching, and, apart from corrupting influences … [In addressing] 
the problem of circularity, the shaykh still has resort to external determinative 
causes. He says that these inner voices arise through the inspiration of an angel or 
other causes (asbāb) that God originates. (Hoover (2007), 41–42) 
Now, it is not altogether clear how this would deal with the charge of circularity, because 
these ‘external determinative causes’ are still asbāb which ‘God originates’ and hence 
presuppose His existence. However, what Hoover does help us to understand here more 
clearly is how knowledge of God (at least in a partial sense) can arise within fiṭra in the 
absence of a connection to God’s signs, which is not at the same time implanted knowledge, 
and can account for what Ibn Taymiyya means when he states that ‘fiṭra knows the Creator 
without these signs’. But perhaps one can simply dismiss this apparent problem of circularity, 
by recognizing the distinction between knowledge in potentia and in actuality. Indeed, Hoover 
explains that, ‘[f]or Ibn Taymiyya, the fiṭra is the religion of Islam, but in potentiality rather 
than in actuality’ (Hoover (2016a), 106). So, we may speculate, then, that the ‘prior 
knowledge’ of God before the apprehension of signs simply refers to a kind of potentiality to 
recognize God, where God not only provides the signs, but also a kind of natural ability to read 
the signs as coming from Him. In this case – where the prior knowledge is taken to be a kind 
of knowledge of God one has in potentia, in one’s ability to recognize God when God prompts 
one to know Him – there is no circularity.8 
Thus, having addressed the main critique of Ibn Taymiyya’s thesis in the literature, in the 
next section, we will attempt to draw on C. Stephen Evans’s ideas on ‘theistic natural signs’, 
and consider how some of those ideas may help us further understand the utility and 
epistemic value of Ibn Taymiyya’s thesis, and also where epistemic space may be left for more 
traditional theistic arguments. 
Theistic natural signs and Pascalian constraints 
In his Natural Signs and Knowledge of God: A New Look at Theistic Arguments , C. Stephen 
Evans argues that behind the traditional theistic arguments lie ‘theistic natural signs’, which 
point to God’s reality, and that their fundamental epistemic value may be viewed in the 
context of these underlying natural signs. He conceives of these signs as bringing God into 
one’s awareness and producing non-inferential beliefs about Him. A theistic natural sign is one 
that God has ‘set up’ so to speak, and put in place such that His creatures may apprehend them, 
and in turn, come to acquire true beliefs about Him. Importantly, Evans argues that for a 
theistic natural sign ‘to be a natural sign at all, there must be some in-built propensity, when 
the sign is encountered, to form some relevant judgement as a result of the encounter with 
the reality mediated by the sign’ (Evans (2010), 38). In other words, there must be a natural 
capacity or inclination within God’s creatures so that they can recognize His signs. 
The plausibility of this approach from one perspective, according to Evans, is its ability 
to satisfy what he coins ‘Pascalian constraints on knowledge of God’ (ibid., 17); what we might 
expect from God by way of evidence, if He does indeed exist. The first of these constraints are 
what he refers to as a ‘Wide Accessibility Principle’. Roughly, the idea is that it is conceivable 
that God would make knowledge of His existence ‘widely available, not difficult to gain’ (ibid., 
13). For given that God created human beings such that they may enter into a ‘relationship’ 
with Him, know Him, and worship Him, He would want to make the possibility of this 
‘relationship’ open to all humans. The second constraint Evans refers to is the ‘Easy 
Resistibility Principle’, meaning that, ‘though knowledge of God is widely available, it is not 
forced on humans’ (ibid., 15), such that those who do not want to enter into a special 
relationship with God will find it easy to reject Him and His existence as a whole. 
It seems to me that Evans’s conception of theistic natural signs neatly ties into the 
Taymiyyan conception of istidlāl bi’l-āyāt. First, Evans’s notion of a ‘theistic natural sign’, as 
the basis of an immediate belief in God, neatly overlaps with what Ibn Taymiyya refers to as 
an āyā which points to God’s existence. Second, as Evans puts it, the ability to grasp the 
concomitance between theistic sign and God presupposes a ‘natural disposition to become 
aware of that reality’ (ibid., 93), which sounds strikingly similar to what Ibn Taymiyya speaks 
of in terms of fiṭra as a disposition for theistic belief: ‘fiṭra has a potency to know and believe 
in the Creator’ (Ibn Taymiyya (1979), 8:458). 
Perhaps more interesting though, is the plausibility of an overlap in terms of the 
aforementioned ‘Pascalian constraints’. Perhaps a Taymiyyan ‘Wide Accessibility Principle’ 
may be found in his saying that, ‘the more people need to know a thing, the easier God has 
made it for the minds of people to know the [corresponding] evidences (adilla) of it’ (Ibn 
Taymiyya (2005), 299). Clearly, knowledge of God is more of a necessity than any other sort 
of knowledge for Ibn Taymiyya. Further, we may infer that the ‘Easy Resistibility Principle’ 
can been teased out of a Taymiyyan epistemology as well. In earlier work, Evans refers to 
what may be taken as the above principle in terms of a person ‘resisting’ the evidence of God’s 
signs, due to them lacking ‘the proper kind of ‘subjectivity’ (Evans (1990), 72). He continues 
by adding that, such evidence ‘can point the sincere seeker in the right direction securely, but 
also allows the one who is rebelling against God to convince himself that religion contains no 
truth’ (ibid., 73). In simple terms, it is evidence which is only ‘powerful for him who has ears 
to hear and eyes to see’ (ibid., 75). As we have seen, for Ibn Taymiyya it is only when one’s 
fiṭra is unimpaired that knowledge of God may be attained from an apprehension of His signs. 
Such impediments upon fiṭra may arise due to certain desires (hawā) or personal motives 
(gharaḍ), which obstructs them from the truth (cf. Ibn Taymiyya (1979), 6:271). Hoover also 
notes that ‘ignorance and heedlessness play a detrimental role’ in the corruption of fiṭra 
according to Ibn Taymiyya, as well as ‘pride, ill purposes, and divided love for God’ (Hoover 
(2007), 43). Therefore, the ability of non-theists to resist the signs of God before them, is due 
to their underlying nature (fiṭra) or will to believe, being in some sense impaired on the 
Taymiyyan perspective.9 These interesting parallels and compatibility between Ibn 
Taymiyya’s and Evans’s theses further reinstate the plausibility of contemporary Muslim 
philosophers drawing on Ibn Taymiyya’s theological epistemology. Moreover, they highlight 
the novelty of views grounded in medieval theological thought and open up space for further 
comparative work. But crucially, they also emphasize the cross-religious accounts of a 
‘Reformed epistemology’ (by which I mean simply that God can be known apart from 
argumentation). But what room may be left for traditional theistic arguments in a Taymiyyan 
epistemology of theistic signs? 
Corruption of fiṭra and signs as a basis for theistic arguments 
Above we outlined Evans’s thesis regarding ‘theistic natural signs’, but we left out a 
crucial component. Evans argues that one can convert the theistic natural signs into 
propositional evidence. That is, one could ‘reflect on a natural sign and make it the basis for 
an argument’ like the cosmological, teleological, and moral arguments, drawing on these 
various signs and using them as ‘data’ which postulates God as the best or only explanation 
(Evans (2018), 109). So, to what extent might a similar postulation be the case concerning Ibn 
Taymiyya’s own thesis on signs and knowledge of God? 
For Ibn Taymiyya, although knowledge of God is principally attainted through fiṭra (upon 
an apprehension of God’s signs) in an immediate manner, it may be possible that one arrives 
at this knowledge by way of argument, and in fact, this may be necessary for those whose fiṭra 
has become impaired. Ibn Taymiyya writes that, 
The establishment and recognition of the Creator is innate [and] necessary in the 
souls of all people (fiṭrī ḍarūrī fī nufūs al-nās), even though some people have done 
something to corrupt their nature (fiṭra) such that they need an inference (naẓar) to 
achieve knowledge [of God]. This is the opinion of the majority of people, as well as 
the skilled debaters (ḥadhāq al-nuẓẓār); that knowledge of God is sometimes 
achieved by necessity [i.e. in ‘basic’ fashion] and other times by inference. (Ibn 
Taymiyya (1995), 16:328) 
In reference to the above passage, Hallaq explains that according to Ibn Taymiyya, 
‘individuals who are devoid of such [sound] fiṭra may still be able to come to the knowledge 
that God exists, though their knowledge is not considered of a first order. This is perfectly in 
agreement with Ibn Taymiyya’s epistemological postulate that inferred knowledge (naẓari, 
muktasab) occupies a rank inferior to immediate necessary knowledge (ḍarūrī)’ (Hallaq 
(1991), 57). Thus, Hallaq recognizes that for Ibn Taymiyya, inference to the existence of God 
is possible, but he also notes how this takes a second rank position epistemically. Therefore, 
Ibn Taymiyya appears to uphold something like the following: ‘a noetic structure N1 in which 
theistic belief is properly basic is epistemically superior to a noetic structure N2 in which 
theistic belief is nonbasic’ (Sudduth (1995), 29). The issue for Ibn Taymiyya then, is evidently 
that the superior method is that which leads to immediate necessary knowledge, namely the 
inference through signs, but he also chastises the theologians/philosophers for narrowing the 
route to knowledge of God. Ibn Taymiyya on the contrary insists that there are many paths to 
this knowledge: 
Many thinkers (nuẓẓār) adopt a certain method of inference and argue that no other 
method can lead to the knowledge required. This negative statement has no validity 
though their own method may be valid. The more people need to know a thing, the 
easier God has made it for the minds of people to know the [corresponding] evidences 
(adilla) of it. The evidences of the Creator, His Unity, and the signs of prophecy and 
their evidences are very many and ways for people to know them are very many. Most 
people, however, do not need many of these ways. (Ibn Taymiyya (2005), 299) 
Thus, although rational speculation is not necessary in theory to prove God’s existence, it 
is possible and in fact may be necessary for those whose fiṭra has been corrupted, and as such, 
some could acquire this knowledge without inference (naẓar), while others need it.10 
Therefore, it would appear that Evans’s thesis concerning theistic natural signs and 
knowledge of God overall is strikingly similar to that of Ibn Taymiyya and vice versa: for 
indeed, knowledge by way of apprehending God’s signs can be immediate and produce basic 
theistic beliefs, but it just may be that some people can (and may have to) infer God’s existence 
through means of a more traditional philosophical argument, which draws on those signs and 
takes them as the basis for those arguments. On the Taymiyyan scheme, this is predicated on 
the habits and methods of individual people (cf. ibid.), but more primarily on the health of 
one’s fiṭra. 
What is also significant in this context is the flexibility and relativity which Ibn Taymiyya 
recognizes in the distinctions between basic (ḍarūrī) and non-basic or acquired (muktasab) 
knowledge depending on the cognitive state of the subject in question. Ibn Taymiyya 
considers ‘knowledge, whether self-evident [i.e. basic] or inferential (naẓariyya) … a relative, 
relational matter. What may be self-evident (badihiyya) for some people may be inferential 
for others’ (ibid., 55). Indeed, there are differences in the intellectual capacities of human 
beings, and the role of fiṭra here is also instrumental, as Ibn Taymiyya states, ‘the foundation 
of reason (‘aql) is based upon sound and healthy fiṭra’ (ibid., 368). 
However, it is important to note that for Ibn Taymiyya, not just any old inference would 
be sufficient, and perhaps some of the arguments employed by the philosophers/ theologians 
of the Islamic tradition would fail to meet the standards of a proper inference on his terms. 
Ibn Taymiyya speaks of ḥuṣn al-naẓar (sound rational inference) as the product of ‘aql ṣarīḥ 
(pure reason). A case in point would be from the very premise that the temporal origination 
(mujarrad al-ḥudūth) of things in our experience requires an originator, likewise so the 
temporal origination of the world itself needs an Originator (cf. Ibn Taymiyya (1979), 8:319). 
This sort of sound rational inference is built on pure reason and undergirded by fiṭra, as Ibn 
Taymiyya points out elsewhere: ‘It is known by the fiṭra which God created His servants upon 
and by the purity of reason (ṣarīḥ al-’aql), that what is temporally originated cannot come into 
being without an originator’ (Ibn Taymiyya (1999), 3:202). Consider then, how ḥuṣn al-naẓar 
may impact knowledge of God, given that one’s fiṭra has become impaired (Figure 2): 
[1] Signs (āyāt) are apprehended through sense perception (SP) (and reason (‘aql) in 
at least some if not all circumstances). [2] Fiṭra – in a state that is unsound – 
negatively impacts the cognitive process, such that the subject fails to arrive at 
properly basic theistic belief. Rather, one has perhaps at best a vague theistic 
seeming. [3] Consequently, one draws upon a sign (āya) they have apprehended and 
constructs a sound rational inference (SRI) from it, establishing the existence of God, 
and hence settled in the qalb, is a non-basic (NB) theistic belief. 
Yet, there is also another way to construe the scenario. Drawing upon the ‘combined 
warrant scenarios’ offered by Kevin S. Diller (2011), suppose one has some vague theistic 
seeming (due to an impaired fiṭra) that God exists, a seeming not strong enough for warrant. 
But then perhaps one learns of some inference for God, say a cosmological argument that goes 
something like this: 
(a) whatever begins to exist has a cause, 
(b) the universe began to exist, 
(c) therefore, the universe has a cause (i.e. God). 
Upon hearing the inference – suppose from your trustworthy philosopher friend – fiṭra, 
in conjunction with the relevant cognitive faculties, is able to see through the initial vague 
theistic seemings and arrive at theistic belief. In this case, it is not that your theistic belief was 
based on the inference, but rather that the inference (in this context being some grasp of the 
cosmological argument and that your friend is trustworthy in such matters) acted as the 
impetus for your vague theistic seemings to become firm and in the end be sufficient for 
warrant, such that you have a properly basic theistic belief.11 Consequently, one is able to 
revive the fiṭrī disposition to believe in God in properly basic fashion, while drawing on 
inferences in some sense. Thus, the source of warrant is the proper function of one’s faculties 
in producing firm theistic seemings, rather than the actual inferences themselves. In this case 
then, it might look something more like the following (Figure 3): 
[1] Signs (āyāt) are apprehended through sense perception (SP) (and reason (‘aql) in 
at least some if not all circumstances) giving one a vague theistic seeming due to fiṭra. 
[2] Having had the seeming, you come to know about a cosmological proof for theism 
(SRI) from a trustworthy intellectual friend. [3] Fiṭra is revived such that you are now 
able to see the initially vague seeming in all its clarity, transferring the mode of 
acquisition back to the original non-inferential process, thereby arriving at a properly 
basic (PB) theistic belief. 
Thus, we have seen in this section, how Ibn Taymiyya allows for more traditional 
inferences to knowledge of God and how one could draw on different āyāt to reach that 
knowledge by way of sound rational inference, and also how inferences can in some way help 
one to revive fiṭra and come to knowledge of God in a properly basic way. But what implication 
might a Taymiyyan epistemology of signs have for the Qur’anic discourse on theistic signs? 
Qur’anic āyāt as divine-design discourse 
According to Ibn Taymiyya, there are two broad categories of signs: ‘the signs which 
indicate [the existence of] the Lord may He be exalted are, [1] His spoken signs that He 
mentions in the Quran, and [2] signs of His creative acting which He created in the souls and 
the cosmos’ (Ibn Taymiyya (1979), 7:302). So, given what his epistemology of theistic signs in 
the natural world implies about knowledge of God, we may wish to ask what a Taymiyyan 
approach might imply for the role of Qur’anic signs functioning as theistic evidence (perhaps 
somewhat differently from the way in which Ibn Rushd perceived things). 
It seems to me that, given a Taymiyyan epistemology of theistic signs applied to the 
Qur’an, we might end up with a view of Qur’anic āyāt functioning as theistic evidence, which 
runs close to what Alvin Plantinga has coined ‘design discourse’ (Plantinga (2011), 240–248). 
Plantinga’s idea is that, rather than viewing teleological discourse in natural theology as the 
explication of inferences, we might rather see them as simply, ‘directing our attention to the 
way we are inclined to form design beliefs in certain circumstances, and trying to get us in 
those circumstances’ (ibid., 247). Or rather, we might view the discourse as a ‘wholly different 
style of argument: one where the arguer tries to help the arguee achieve the sort of situation 
in which the Sensus Divinitatis operates’ (Plantinga (2018), 470), or roughly what Evans 
coins, ‘an argument for ordinary people’ (cf. Evans (2018), 108–122). 
In other words, we may view the Qur’an – when engaged in alerting its audience to 
natural phenomena which are indicative of the divine12 – not as offering inferences from 
design (or from other features in the world), or even pieces of evidence which supports or 
inspires those inferences (at least not primarily). Rather, it is to be seen as engaged in a 
‘divine-design-discourse’, one that works to awaken fiṭra and open its sincere interlocutor to 
the truth behind the signs. This idea would seem to neatly map onto a Taymiyyan 
understanding of a sign-based ‘inference’ in tandem with the Qur’an. Roughly, the idea might 
be that the Qur’an, in making reference to the natural signs in creation, acts as the external 
prompting, and grounds the circumstances in which the fiṭrī response to an apprehension of 
and reflection over these āyāt may be achieved. Indeed, it is Ibn Taymiyya’s view of prophecy 
more generally that it came to perfect fiṭra: encouraging believers towards the recognition, 
worship, and love of God (cf. Hoover (2007), 44). 
Furthermore, the notion of divine-design discourse perhaps better resonates with an 
experiential approach that inspires not merely theistic affirmation or belief, but also urges the 
believer to stand in awe and wonder of these signs, and hence engage in praise of the very 
source of them (i.e. God). Thus, Ibn Taymiyya explains that, 
The distinction between the Qur’anic and the kalām theological methods is indeed 
that God commands worship of Him … He did not limit it to mere affirmation, as is 
the objective of the methods of kalām … the Qur’an [in contrast] relates knowledge 
of Him and service to Him. So, it combines the human faculties of knowledge and 
practice … [kalām methods] secures merely the affirmation and acknowledgment of 
God’s existence. (Ibn Taymiyya (1995), 2:12)  
Finally, conceiving of these sorts of immediate beliefs elicited from signs as an ‘argument 
for ordinary people’ is significant. For one, it allows us to conceive of Ibn Taymiyya’s own 
thesis that is, the Qur’anic method he interprets as the inference through signs, as being a 
wholly different sort of ‘inference’ in contrast to traditional theistic arguments, where, in 
alerting subjects to the signs of God, it can trigger immediate theistic beliefs when one’s fiṭra 
is sound. From this perspective, the Taymiyyan position would seem to suggest that the 
Qur’anic method for eliciting theistic beliefs as divine-design discourse is equally applicable 
to the philosopher as it is the layman, which of course resonates with the Qur’anic view as 
being a revelation to humanity, and hence epistemically egalitarian, as opposed to esoteric. 
This view may be seen as an extension of what Yahya Michot describes as ‘the self-sufficiency 
of the religious rationality manifested in scriptural literality and common faith, and its validity 
for all, the elite as well as the crowd’ (Michot (2003), 171), in the Taymiyyan scheme. Thus, 
the philosophical methods of rational speculation are not necessary for most people. Rather, 
‘authentic knowledge is available to anyone whose basic rational faculty and fiṭra are intact, 
not just an elite coterie of philosophers’ (El-Tobgui (2020), 293). And as we have seen 
authentic knowledge of God is thought to be principally the consequence of perceiving the His 
signs manifest in the natural world. 
Conclusion 
At the beginning of this article, we mentioned Ibn Rushd, who drew on particular verses/ 
signs (āyāt) from the Qur’an in articulating two arguments for God’s existence. In contrast, to 
Muslim philosophers like Ibn Rushd and the classical Muslim theologians (mutakallimūn), Ibn 
Taymiyya presents a unique alternative to construing how knowledge of God may be attained 
in the absence of argumentation: through an apprehension of theistic natural signs (āyāt). 
Significantly, this unique Taymiyyan approach gives us a fresh way to understand the 
epistemic function of Qur’anic āyāt as theistic evidence. Indeed, Ibn Taymiyya views his 
approach as the Qur’anic method of natural theology par excellence and hence, in opening 
space from which an Islamic natural theology grounded in the Qur’an allows for its subjects 
to uphold knowledge of God, despite the lack of inference, it opens space to exploring 
Reformed epistemology within Islam.  
 
Notes 
1. For example, Qur’an 78:6–16; 25:61. 
2. This broadly empiricist epistemology is to some extent evident in his treatment of attaining 
knowledge of God through theistic signs, as it primarily relies on our immediate experience and 
perception, not abstract deduction. 
3. The basis for the idea of ‘corruption’ by external influence for Ibn Taymiyya’s notion of fiṭra is the 
famous report of the Prophet, ‘Narrated [by] Abu Hurayra: God’s Messenger said, “No child is born 
except upon a natural constitution (fiṭra), and then his parents turn him into a Jew or a Christian or a 
Magian”’ (al-Bukhārī (2001), 6:114). 
4. I would like to thank a referee of this journal for raising this point.  
5. In fact, not only are the philosophical ‘proofs’ of God developed by the Islamic theologians  
unnecessary in Ibn Taymiyya’s view, they are also theologically problematic (cf. Hoover (2016b), 636–
637). 
6. ‘The internal [bāṭin] is represented by such phenomena as hate, fear, love, hunger; and the external  
[ẓāhir] by touch, smell and taste’ (Hallaq (1991), 63). 
7. Bergmann defines that context as (EC = epistemic circularity): ‘where, prior to the EC-belief’s  
formation, the subject is or should be seriously questioning or doubting the trustworthiness of X [i.e. 
the source of the belief] or the reliability of B’s formation’ (Bergmann (2006), 199). Bergmann has it 
that an epistemically circular belief formed in such a situation then is ‘malignant’. In contrast, benign 
cases of EC occur in non-question doubting situations where: ‘prior to the EC-belief’s formation, the 
subject neither is nor should be seriously questioning or doubting the trustworthiness of X or the 
reliability of B’s formation’ (ibid.). 
8. I would like to thank the referees for helping me ‘drive this point home’. 
9. For an interesting take on how the corruption of our disposition to form theistic beliefs could look 
from an epistemic perspective, cf. Vahid (2019). 
10. Ibn Taymiyya also notes that one way to restore the fiṭrī and necessary knowledge of God is through 
a purification of the soul through religious practices (cf. Ibn Taymiyya (1972), 2:341).  
11. Diller presents what he coins an example of a ‘combined warrant scenario’, one of which runs  
parallel to the example I have just given. Diller’s more mundane example is that of an individual who – 
whilst engaged in some activity inside their home – suddenly hears a sound which prompts them to 
look outside their window, finding a glimpse of someone in the shadows. At first they don’t know what 
to think exactly, but then they remember it’s around that time of day when the postman comes to 
deliver his letters to the home. Consequently, they form the warranted conclusion that that indistinct 
sound they heard was the letter coming through the letter box, and that figure in the shadows was the 
postman. Diller argues that it is possible to construe this in inferential terms. But crucially, it’s also 
possible to view the scenario as one where the initial sense-perceptual seeming that there is some 
sound, can remain vague until this inferential reflection allows the seeming to be perceived much more 
clearly than it was at first. In doing so, these inferential judgements work as the catalyst for one’s sense 
perception to grasp the seeming in full, and hence form a properly (partially?)-basic belief upon the 
grounds of the relevant seemings, even if inference was in some sense involved in the process.  
12. Cf. Qur’an 3:190; 41:53; 16:66–67. 
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